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THE SUPREME COURT'S 1984-85 CHURCH-STATE 
DECISIONS: JUDICIAL PATHS OF LEAST 
RESISTANCE 
Ruti G. Teitel* 
Introduction 
The scope of first amendment protection of religious free-
dom was a central issue during the 1984-85 Supreme Court 
Term. 1 Of the 185 cases granted review, seven alleged violations 
of the religion clauses~2 Five of these claimed violations of the 
establishment clause, challenging prayer in public schools,3 gov-
ernment aid to parochial schools,4 display of a Nativity scene 
on public land,5 and legislation requiring employers to allow 
Sabbath observers a day of rest. 6 Two cases asserted free ex-
ercise claims, challenging government regulation of commercial 
activities of religious institutions7 and a state requirement of 
photographs on drivers' licenses.8 These cases were litigated at 
a time when the Burger Court's approach to religion cases was 
in a state of flux, departing from the Warren Court's legacy of 
strict separation of church and state and from strict application 
*Assistant Director, Legal Affairs Department, Anti-Defamation League of B'nai 
B'rith. J.D., Cornell Law School, 1980; B.S., Georgetown University, 1977. The author 
would like to thank Robert Sugarman, Steven Freeman, the Anti-Defamation League 
of B'nai B'rith, and Weil, Gotshal & Manges for their assistance. The views expressed 
in this Article are solely those of the author. 
1 The first amendment's establishment and free exercise clauses provide, "Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion~ or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof .... "U.S. Const. amend. I. 
2 Religion cases, especially those dealing with free exercise issues, also account for 
a significant number of cases on the Court's 1985-86 docket. See infra text accom-
panying notes 188-200. 
3 Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985). 
•Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985); Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105 
S. Ct. 3216 (1985). 
5 Bd. of Trustees v. McCreary, 105 S. Ct. 1859 (1985), ajf'g by an equally divided 
Court McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1984). 
6 Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2914 (1985). 
7 Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 105 S. Ct. 1953 (1985). 
8 Jensen v. Quaring, 105 S. Ct. 3492 (1985), aff'g by an equally divided Court 
Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1984). 
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of the establishment test formulated by the Burger Court itself 
in Lemon v. Kurtzman. 9 
In this climate of change, the Court's grant of certiorari to 
seven religion cases augured a revolution in church-state doc-
trine.10 This revolution, however, did not occur. The outcomes 
of the key establishment cases may have appeared to reaffirm 
principles of separation. However, the opinions in these cases 
continued the recent trend away from strict separation. The 
holdings in the establishment cases were narrow and can be 
explained by their close factual similarities to controlling prec-
edents rather than by a doctrinal shift. 11 Several of the 1984-85 
decisions also reflect a special standard of review that is partic-
ularly protective of children. 12 Outside of these two considera-
tions, the Court has continued to apply a considerably weakened 
version of the Lemon test. 13 
This Article presents a critical analysis of the Supreme 
Court's 1984-85 religion cases, tracing the developments which 
have transformed the Lemon test into a device which elevates 
the form and context of challenged government aid to consti-
tutional dimensions. It argues that the deferential nature of the 
Court's review, and the absence of a workable theory to secure 
individual religious liberty, seriously undermine the protection 
of that liberty against legislative encroachment. Part I examines 
the Burger Court's approach to religious issues in previous 
terms and sketches an overview of the 1984-85 cases. Part II 
explains how the holdings of the 1984-85 cases were determined 
by precedents involving substantially similar facts. Part III pres-
ents three themes or standards that emerge from these cases. 
Part IV analyzes the weakened version of the Lemon test that 
is used by the current Court. Part V discusses some broad 
conceptual problems in the Court's approach. Finally, Part VI 
of the Article takes a brief look at the Court's 1985-86 Term. 
9 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). 
10 See Greenhouse, Supreme Court May Shift From Separation To Accommodation, 
The Highest Legal Authority Enters Church-State Debate, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1984, 
§ 4, at 2, col. 3; Lauter, Major Shift Looming in Church·State Law, Nat'! L.J., Sept. 
10, 1984, at 1. 
11 See infra text accompanying notes 46-100. 
12 See infra text accompanying notes 112-19, 159-64. 
13 See infra text accompanying notes 123-79. 
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I. Context and Parameters 
A. The Shift from Separation to "Accommodation" 
The Burger Court's approach to religion issues began in 
1971 with Lemon v. Kurtzman, which adopted a tripartite test 
for establishment questions. 14 The Lemon test would invalidate 
the state practice or legislation if its purpose was religious, if 
its primary effect was to advance religion, or if it entailed ex-
cessive government entanglement in religious affairs. This strict 
approach to establishment cases apparently derived from a be-
lief that government support of religion is inherently coercive, 
even if extended to all religions. 15 The Court in Lemon construed 
the establishment clause's protection of individual religious lib-
erty as guaranteeing independence from government promotion 
or encouragement of religion. 
At the same time, the Court also recognized that the free 
exercise clause requires protection from government burdens 
on religious liberty. 16 In the landmark case of Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 17 the Court interpreted the free exercise clause as man-
dating a religious exemption from compulsory school attendance 
for Amish children. The free exercise clause necessitated this 
exemption because the government interests in compulsory ed-
ucation, while strong, could not override tenets central to the 
Amish religion. 
This twofold understanding of the first amendment's pro-
tection of religious liberty-an establishment mandate against 
14 403 U.S. at 612-13. Lemon followed more than 30 years of case-by-case review 
of state legislation affecting religious freedoms. The Court first applied the free exercise 
clause to the states in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (upholding free 
exercise right to proselytize in streets), and the establishment clause in Everson v. Bd. 
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 13 (1947) (upholding state reimbursement for bus fare paid by 
parochial school students). While cases during this period sometimes articulated a strict 
standard concerning government financing of religion, no functional tests were proposed. 
See, e.g., Everson, 330 U.S. 1; McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948). 
15 See Everson, 330 U.S. at 15 ("Neither a state nor the Federal Government can 
... pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over 
another.") (emphasis added). Thus the Court barred religious instruction in public 
schools even where it was multidenominational. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 
203 (1948). Where the challenged support was financial, taxpayer coercion raised an 
additional establishment concern. See, e.g., Everson, 330 U.S. at 13. 
16 See, e.g.; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (burden on free exercise must 
be justified by compelling state interest); Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16. 
17 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
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government promotion of religion, and a concomitant free ex-
ercise protection of individual religious interests-appeared t<;> 
erode in recent terms. A more permissive approach, which al-
lowed government financial aid for a variety of religious pur-
poses, developed in its stead. The Court upheld government aid 
to religion in several cases: Lynch v. Donnelly18 upheld a mu-
nicipally-funded Nativity display; Marsh v. Chambers19 upheld 
a sectarian legislative chaplaincy; Widmar v. Vincent20 upheld a 
public university prayer club, and Mueller v. Allen21 upheld the 
allowance of tuition tax deductions to parents of parochial 
school children. The Lemon test for establishment cases had 
apparently given way to a more ad hoc standard of governmental 
"accommodation"22 of religion, under which the Court deferred 
to legislation promoting the interests of majoritarian religions. 
This new version of the accommodation doctrine, drawn from 
historical analysis and from free exercise doctrine,23 confused 
the relevant inquiries of the free exercise and establishment 
clauses, diluting the protections afforded by both. 
Applying this ad hoc standard to establishment cases, the 
Court relied on longstanding "unbroken history,"24 competing 
first amendment requirements,25 and other policy concerns26 to 
1s 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
19 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
20 454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
21 463 U.S. 388 (1983). 
22 See, e.g., Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673 (Constitution mandates "accommodation" of 
all religions). The new accommodation doctrine claims to address a conflict between 
the free exercise and establishment mandates. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673; see also 
i11fra text accompanying notes 180-87. 
23 The historical support derives from Story's commentaries, which are cited at 
great length in Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2488-89, and from the traditional nature of the 
activity, see infra text accompanying notes 102-11. The Court has drawn the free 
exercise component from early Supreme Court cases such as Zorach v. Clauson, 343 
U.S. 306 (1952) (upholding released-time program in which religious classes were held 
in church buildings) and McCollum. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673. 
24 See, e.g., Lynch, 465 U.S. at 674; Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792. 
25 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673 (concern with free exercise); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 
U.S. 263, 271-72 (1981) ("[A]n open-forum policy, including nondiscrimination against 
religious speech, would have a secular purpose and would avoid entanglement with 
religion."). But see id. at 287 n.5 (White, J., dissenting) ("I know ofno precedent holding 
that simply because a public forum is open to all kinds of speech-including speech 
about religion-it must be open to regular religious worship services as well."). 
26 See, e.g., Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 106 S. Ct. 748 (1986) 
(vocational rehabilitation funding upheld even where used for religious purpose); Muel-
ler, 463 U.S. 388 (stressing interest in education). 
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uphold the challenged practices. Thus accommodation, "illu-
minated by history," appeared to replace the Lemon test; the 
Court focused on the form, context,27 and perception28 of gov-
ernment aid rather than on religious intent or effect. 
In free exercise cases, the new accommodation doctrine 
threatened to allow governmental, majoritarian interests to 
override the interests of religious minorities. The interest in 
maintaining traffic flow on state fair grounds, for example, de-
feated a religious claim of a right to circulate and proselytize 
freely among visitors to the fair. 29 The Court also upheld the 
government's interest in mandatory payments to Social Security 
as "indispensible to the fiscal vitality of the . . . system, "30 even 
though it accepted the contention that both payment and receipt 
of Social Security benefits are forbidden by the Amish faith. 31 
Government interests in administrative convenience and uni-
formity apparently outweighed the free exercise rights of groups 
or individuals who challenged specific government regulation as 
burdensome to religious practice. 
Rather than shielding minority religions whose beliefs and 
practices are at odds with government regulation, the Court 
now protects majoritarian religions whose practices and beliefs 
have been assimilated by affirmative governmental regulation. 
Under this new approach, the only limit on governmental aid to 
religion is a putative historically-based protection against 
coerced orthodoxy. 32 When the Court relied on tradition to up-
hold the Lynch Nativity scene and the legislative chaplaincy in 
Marsh, it essentially decreed that minority religions must ac-
commodate majoritarian religious practices which have become 
part of, and legitimated by, American culture. The mere passage 
of time thus acts as a statute of limitations; a practice that 
TT See infra text accompanying notes 134-57. 
28 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See infra text accompanying 
notes 158-74. 
29 Heffron v. Int'l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981). 
30 United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258 (1982). 
31 Id. at 257. 
32 Thus in Lynch the test was whether the challenged legislation "in reality .•. 
establishes a religious faith, or tends to do so." 465 U.S. at.678. This standard was 
adopted verbatim by the Lynch Court from the Solicitor General's arguments in the 
case. See Brief amicus curiae of the United States at 36. The United States has been 
promoting the new accommodation doctrine. See Brief amicus curiae of the United 
States, Jaffree. 
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continues long enough becomes a tradition, insulated from later 
establishment challenge.33 
B. Form Over Substance-A Minimalist Approach to 
Protection of Individual Religious Liberty 
This recent judicial shift, in which the Court adopted ac-
commodation in the context of government promotion of reli-
gion and upheld the government's asserted interests in efficiency 
and convenience when minority religions sought accommoda-
tion, indicated a new judicial deference to majoritarian legisla-
tion. When the Court granted review to seven church-state cases 
in the 1984-85 Term, this trend was expected to climax with 
the consolidation of a new doctrine. 
This consolidation did not take place. The Court struck 
down various forms of government aid to religion as violating 
the establishment clause: Wallace v. Jaffree34 invalidated an 
Alabama silent prayer statute; Thornton v. Caldor35 overturned 
a Connecticut statute providing absolute accommodation for 
Sabbath observers, notwithstanding the resulting burden or in-
convenience on the employer or fellow workers; Grand Rapids 
v. Ball36 and Aguilar v. Felton31 invalidated state and federal 
programs which financed remedial and enrichment courses 
taught by public and private school teachers on parochial school 
premises. In Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor,38 the 
Court denied a free exercise claim for an exemption from federal 
minimum wage laws for the commercial activities of an evan-
gelical organization. Finally, the Court divided equally in both 
Board of Trustees v. McCreary,39 which upheld use of public 
land for a privately financed Nativity display, and Jensen v. 
ii See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 626 (establishment claim made in Walz "could not stand 
up against more than 200 years of virtually universal practice imbedded in our colonial 
experience and continuing into the present"). 
:w 105 S. Ct. at 2479. 
is 105 S. Ct. 2914, 2917. 
:J6 105 S. Ct. 3216. 
i 7 105 S. Ct. 3232. 
is 105 S. Ct. 1953. 
i 9 105 S. Ct. 1859. 
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Quaring, 40 which upheld a free exercise exemption from driver's 
license photograph requirements. · 
In light of previous decisions such as Mueller, Marsh and 
Lynch, which allowed various forms of government aid to reli-
gion, some commentators interpreted the results in J affree, 
Grand Rapids, Aguilar and Thornton as a return to principles 
of separation of church and state, as crucial to the protection 
of religious liberty and as a revitalization of the Lemon test in 
analyzing establishment challenges.41 
This Article takes a different view. Much of the 1984-85 
Term can be seen as narrow application of precedent rather than 
as a retreat from the Court's recent accommodation initiative.42 
More significantly, the standards of review employed in these 
opinions would allow some government aid intended for a reli-
gious purpose. While the Court has not yet clearly articulated 
a new doctrine, it appears to be groping for standards of judicial 
review. Several Justices have interpreted the first amendment 
religion clauses to prohibit government financial assistance only 
if the reasons for such assistance are exclusively religious.43 
Under this approach, any secular purpose will justify govern-
ment aid to religion. 
The Court now places more importance on the appearance 
or perception of government aid than on its objective. This 
emphasis is reflected in the application of a new, weakened form 
of the Lemon test and in the "endorsement test" proposed by 
Justice O'Connor in her Lynch concurrence.44 It is also reflected 
in a heightened concern with the form and context of the gov-
ernment aid. 45 This perspective provides great protection to 
children, who are considered to be more likely to perceive 
government aid as government endorsement, but little protec-
tion to minority religious interests in general. It also demon-
strates continued judicial permissiveness toward government 
40 105 S. Ct. 3492. 
41 See, e.g., McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 2 
(forthcoming). 
42 See infra text accompanying notes 46-100. 
43 See infra text accompanying notes 124-30. 
44 See infra text accompanying notes 165-74. 
4s See infra text accompanying notes 135-57. 
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support of religion. Such permissiveness is particularly threat-
ening to minority religions, because majoritarian community 
acceptance is inherent in any "longstanding tradition." Without 
independent judicial review, majoritarian religious practices will 
be virtually impossible to challenge. 
Thus while there is a consensus on the Court which would 
sustain government aid to majoritarian religions, depending 
upon the form and context of the aid, the same consensus would 
deny free exercise exemptions sought by minority religions, 
deferring instead to the legislature's concern with mere admin-
istrative or economic interests. The Court's new accommoda-
tion approach has simultaneously reduced both establishment 
and free exercise protections, abdicating issues of individual 
religious liberty to the legislature, where they will rise or fall as 
a matter of majority fiat. 
II. Old Wine in New Bottles 
One reason why the 1984-85 decisions should not be viewed 
as a return to separation is that they presented facts very similar 
to those of previous cases that were decided under a stricter 
approach. Several of the 1984-85 cases involved clear attempts 
to circumvent those earlier rulings. It is not surprising, there-
fore, that the results in these new cases upheld the separation 
of church and state. The holdings were narrow, however, with 
limited precedential value. Furthermore, the results, determined 
by previous cases, should not disguise the continuing deterio-
ration of separation principles. 
A. The Return of School Prayer 
Wallace v. Jaffree46 posed the first reconsideration of 
teacher-led religious activities in the public schools since the 
decisions in Engel v. Vitale41 and Abington School District v. 
46 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985). 
47 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (invalidating teacher-led prayer in public schools). 
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Schempp48 in the 1960's barred teacher-led school prayer and 
Bible reading. 49 The J affree decision, striking down Alabama 
legislation which authorized a one-minute period of silence "for 
meditation or voluntary prayer,"50 rests on the determination 
that the statute's purpose was exclusively religious.51 This con-
clusion is based on the legislative history of the statute as well 
as its text. Since the statute at issue amended prior legislation 
providing only for "meditation," the Court found the addition 
of the words "or voluntary prayer" to indicate that "the State 
intended to characterize prayer as a favored practice. "52 The 
Court held that this endorsement of religion violated the estab-
lishment clause. 
The impact of Jaffree is limited to the reaffirmation of a 
silent version of Engel; a majority of the Justices believes that 
the Alabama statute shared the Engel statute's objective of 
authorizing teacher-led prayer. The Court does not indicate a 
willingness to go further and find that all teacher-led moments 
of silence violate the establishment clause. To the contrary, the 
Court appears to approve of the prior Alabama "meditation" 
statute as "merely protecting every student's right to engage in 
voluntary prayer during an appropriate moment of silence during 
the school day."53 The concurring opinions of Justices Powell 
and O'Connor also support some form of moment of silence 
legislation. 54 The J affree decision thus decides only the permis-
sibility of government-endorsed silent prayer and not, contrary 
to popular view, the constitutionality of government-sponsored 
moments of silence. 
48 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (invalidating recitation of Lord's Prayer and Bible reading). 
49 When the Court considered Jaffree, 24 other moment of silence statutes were in 
force nationwide, all of which had been enacted subsequent to Engel and Schempp. See 
Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2498 n.1. 
50 Ala. Code § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984). 
51 105 S. Ct. at 2492 ("The Legislature enacted§ 16-1-20.1 ... for the sole purpose 
of expressing the State's endorsement of prayer activities for one minute at the beginning 
of each school day."). 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 2491. 
54 Id. at 2495 (Powell, J., concurring) ("the 'effect' ofa straightforward moment-of-
silence statute is unlikely to 'advanc[e] or inhibit religion"'); id. at 2501 (O'Connor, J., 
concurring) ("moment of silence laws in many States should pass establishment clause 
scrutiny"). 
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B. "On Premises" Aid to Parochial Schools 
The 1984-85 parochiaid cases arose against the background 
of the 1983 Mueller55 decision. Mueller sustained a tuition tax 
deduction benefitting parents of parochial school children but 
theoretically available to parents of public school children as 
well.56 The Court in Mueller relied on the ostensible availability 
of tax relief to all parents in order to distinguish adverse prec-
edent, 57 even though parents of public school children rarely 
incurred the expenses necessary to qualify for the deduction. 58 
This fiction of equal aid sufficed to change the result even though 
the statute retained the effect of uniquely benefitting parents of 
parochial school children. 
In this context of apparent judicial receptivity to govern-
ment support for parochial schools, Grand Rapids v. Ball59 and 
Aguilar v. Felton60 brought the schoolroom back to the Court 
in the 1984-85 Term. Both cases involved legislative schemes 
which skirted Meek v. Pittenger,61 where the Court had prohib-
ited state employees, including teachers, from providing ser-
vices to parochial school students on the school premises. 
In Grand Rapids, the Court considered two state-financed 
programs, Shared Time and Community Education, which pro-
vided courses for parochial school students- in classrooms lo-
cated in, and leased from, parochial schools. The Shared Time 
instructors were primarily public school teachers. The Com-
munity Education instructors were full-time parochial school 
teachers, functioning as part-time "public school" teachers at 
55 463 U.S. 388 (1983). 
56 The statute at issue in Mueller provides a deduction for actual expenses incurred 
for the "tuition, textbooks and transportation" of dependents attending elementary or 
secondary schools. It does not distinguish between public and parochial school expen-
ses. See 463 U.S. at 391. 
57 Mueller had ·come close to overruling a prior case, Comm. for Public Educ. and 
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), in which the Court invalidated a 
New York statute providing a tax credit only to parents of private school students. The 
Mueller fiction of equal aid to both religious and nonreligious parents of school children 
apparently swayed Justice Powell from his opposition to the tuition tax credit in Nyquist. 
Powell's vote was also crucial in Grand Rapids and Aguilar. 
58 See infra note 148. 
59 105 S. Ct. 3216 (1985). 
ro 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985). 
61 421 U.S. 349 (1975). 
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the close of the parochial school day, when they taught the 
program's secular courses. The statute attempted to evade Meek 
by providing for the "leasing" of parochial school premises, 
theoretically converting them into a "public school" while the 
programs took place. 62 
Aguilar v. Felton involved a Title I program of the Elemen-
tary and Secondary Education Act of 1965,63 which provided 
federal funds to pay the salaries of public school employees 
teaching remedial courses on parochial school premises. The 
drafters of the Title I program64 sought to circumvent Meek by 
providing for supervision of the public school teachers to pre-
vent any religious indoctrination. 65 
The Court relied on Meek as controlling precedent when it 
invalidated the programs in Grand Rapids and Aguilar.66 The 
narrowness of the holdings, however, reflects a lack of consen-
sus for extending this precedent. Government aid for religious 
schools is not deemed to be unconstitutional in itself; providing 
assistance to all school children, including those attending reli-
gious schools, satisfies the Court's requirement of a secular 
purpose.67 As in Meek, the operative fact is not the government 
aid in itself, but rather the delivery of that aid on religious school 
premises. 68 The Court explained the importance of the latter by 
emphasizing the danger that school children will perceive gov-
ernment programs on parochial grounds as an official endorse-
ment of religion. 69 From this perspective, the ongoing govern-
62 105 S. Ct. at 3220. 
63 See 20 U.S.C. § 3805(a) (1982). 
64 Title I authorizes federal funding for programs proposed by local educational 
agencies and approved by state educational agencies. 20 U.S.C. § 3805(a) (1982). 
65 This supervision responded to the Court's suggestions in Meek: "To be certain 
that auxiliary teachers remain religiously neutral, as the Constitution demands, the State 
would have to impose limitations on the activities of auxiliary personnel and then engage 
in some form of continuing surveillance to ensure that those restrictions were being 
followed." 421 U.S. at 372. The Aguilar Court, however, found this supervision to 
present entanglement problems. 105 S. Ct. at 3237. 
66 See Grand Rapids, 105 S. Ct. at 3225; Aguilar, 105 S. Ct. at 3238. 
67 See, e.g., Grand Rapids, 105 S. Ct. at 3223 (Although the Court found that here 
the "principal effect of the challenged programs [was] to advance ... religion," the 
Court upheld the lower court's finding that "the purpose of the Community Education 
and Shared Time programs was 'manifestly secular.'"). 
68 See Aguilar, 105 S. Ct. at 3236 ("aid is provided in a pervasively sectarian 
environment"); Grand Rapids, 105 S. Ct. at 3223 ("inquiry must begin with a consid-
eration of the nature of the institutions in which the programs operate"). 
69 See Grand Rllpids, 105 S. Ct. at 3223. This focus on the "imprimatur"-here, the 
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ment inspections in Aguilar were not an acceptable remedy for 
the risks presented. 
C. Public Display of a Privately Financed Nativity Scene 
Board of Trustees v. McCreary70 forced the Court to con-
front the implications of its earlier decisions in Widmar v. 
Vincent71 and Lynch v. Donnelly.72 Appellees in McCreary 
claimed a free speech right to erect their Nativity display for a 
two-week period on a small public traffic circle park in the center 
of town. The Village of Scarsdale objected on establishment 
clause grounds. Relying on Widmar and Lynch, the Second 
Circuit upheld appellees' right to erect a Nativity display on 
public property. 73 
McCreary raised several issues which earlier decisions had 
left unresolved: To what extent does the religious free speech 
right recognized in Widmar extend to an unattended display? 
Where public forum principles do not compel access to village 
land, is access a discretionary matter for the village govern-
ment? After Lynch, are there any limits to a village's discretion 
over Nativity displays, or would public sponsorship be imper-
missible where the display is solitary, rather than surrounded 
by secular symbols, and where it is located on public, rather 
than private, land? Towns and villages across the nation were 
asking these types of questions;74 unfortunately, the Court failed 
to answer them during the 1984-85 Term. Justice Powell's ab-
sence from the McCreary oral argument left an equally divided 
Court affirming the Second Circuit's holding. Justice Powell had 
provided the crucial vote in two other establishment cases of 
the Term, Grand Rapids and Aguilar, and his concern during 
children's perception of the government aid-appears to limit Grand Rapids and Aguilar, 
as well as Meek, to the special "religion in the schools" caselaw. See infra text accom-
panying notes 112-19, 158-64. 
10 105 S. Ct. at 3216. 
71 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (student prayer group had free speech right to meet on public 
university grounds). 
n 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (allowing government financial sponsorship of Nativity 
display). 
73 McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d at 726-27 (2d Cir. 1984). 
74 See After Pawtucket: Religious Symbols on Public Land, Report of American 
Jewish Congress (July, 1985) (on file with the Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law 
Review). 
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the Term with links between public and religious institutions75 
might have suggested opposition to the Scarsdale creche display. 
However, this concern had not prevented Justice Powell from 
joining the majority opinion in Lynch or from authoring the 
opinion for the Court in Widmar. Consequently, theories of how 
the case would have been decided had Justice Powell taken part 
in the decision can only be speculative. 
D. Establishment and Other Limits to Free Exercise 
In the remaining 1984-85 religion cases, the Court contin-
ued to minimize free exercise concerns, elevating in their place 
administrative or convenience interests and a purported fear of 
establishment problems. Thornton v. Caldor16 concerned a sta-
tutory mandate that an employee who observed a particular day 
of the week as his Sabbath could not be required by his employer 
to work on that day.77 The statute was designed to give protec-
tion for Sabbath observance after a state court eliminated Con-
necticut's Blue Laws.78 However, unlike federal law, which 
provides merely for "reasonable accommodation, "79 the Con-
necticut statute failed to qualify the Sabbath observer's right. 80 
The Court invalidated the provision as impermissibly coer-
cive, focusing on the absence of any reasonableness or balancing 
test in the statute that would permit employers to consider other 
interests. These ostensibly weighty concerns include the "con-
venience" of other employees. 81 The Court also made cursory 
reference to the fact that the statute granted religious employees 
a guaranteed day off every week-a right also valued by non-
religious employees. The Court held that the Connecticut statute 
1s See Aguilar, 105 S. Ct. at 3240. 
76 105 S. Ct. 2914 (1985). 
77 
"No person who states that a particular day of the week is observed as his 
Sabbath may be required by his employer to work on such day. An employee's refusal 
to work on his Sabbath shall not constitute grounds for his dismissal." Conn. Gen. Stat. 
Ann. § 53-303e(b) (West Supp. 1985). 
78 The Connecticut Blue Laws have a complex history, both in the legislature and 
in the state courts. See Thornton, 105 S. Ct. at 2915 n.2. 
79 42 u.s.c. § 2oooeG) (1981). 
80 See Thornton, 105 S. Ct. at 2917-18 ("the statute allows for no consideration as 
to whether the employee has made reasonable accommodation proposals"); see also id. 
at 2919 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
s1 See 105 S. Ct. at 2918. 
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violated the establishment clause because it protected the rights 
of Sabbath observers at the expense of others.82 
The nearly unanimous but cursory opinion in Thornton can 
only be explained against the backdrop of prior Blue Laws 
cases. In McGowan v. Maryland,83 the Court had relied on 
secular justifications to uphold Sunday closing laws against es-
tablishment challenges.84 In Braunfeld v. Brown,85 decided the 
same year, the Court had denied Orthodox Jews a free exercise 
exemption to the Sunday laws, explaining that the laws imposed 
a mere economic burden, rather than a direct burden on the 
exercise of religion. 86 While the state prohibited sales of retail 
goods on Sundays, it did not bar a Saturday holiday; such a 
direct penalty presumably would have posed a free exercise 
conflict that the Court would have had to recognize. 87 
As in these earlier cases, the Court in Thornton failed to 
recognize the need for true free exercise accommodation. At 
least two Justices considered such accommodation unnecessary, 
partially because any burden suffered by Thornton was imposed 
by his employer rather than by the government. 88 Even where 
there is a true government-imposed conflict, however, Thornton 
has wider implications for the future of free exercise accom-
modations. Echoing Braunfeld, the Court expressed a concern 
82 Id.; see also id. at 2919 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
Bl 366 U.S. 420 (1961). 
e. "[S]ecular justifications have been advanced for making Sunday a day of rest ... 
when people may recover from the labors of the week .... " 366 U.S. at 434. 
BS 366 U.S. 599 (1961). 
l!6 Id. at 606 ("To strike down, without the most critical scrutiny, legislation which 
imposes only an indirect burden on the exercise of religion, i.e., legislation which does 
not make unlawful the religious practice itself, would radically restrict the operating 
latitude of the legislature."). 
Notwithstanding the burden/penalty distinction drawn in Braunfeld, the Court has 
chosen in other free exercise cases to grant exemptions where there was merely an 
economic burden. See Thomas v. Review Bd. oflnd. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 
707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
87 See Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 606 ("[T]his is not the case before us because the 
statute at bar does not make unlawful any religious practices of appellants."). 
88 Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion addresses this point directly, noting that 
the statute "attempts to lift a burden on religious practice that is imposed by private 
employers, and hence it is not the sort of accommodation statute specifically contem-
plated by the Free Exercise Clause." 105 S. Ct. at 2919. See also Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 
2496 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
The Thornton majority does not expressly recognize the absence of a government 
burden on private employees, although it does emphasize that through the statute the 
state places a burden on private employers. See 105 S. Ct. at 2918. 
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for equal treatment, noting that the statute would provide a 
benefit only to Sabbath observers. The Court followed the anal-
ysis employed earlier in TWA v. Hardison,89 where an employee 
sought Saturdays off under the "reasonable accommodation" 
standard imposed by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 90 In that 
case, the Court held that the desired accommodation would have 
resulted in "unequal treatment" in favor of the religious ob-
server, underscoring the constraints of equal protection within 
which religious accommodation must function. 91 The Thornton 
Court suggests that this accommodation, with its implicit en-
dorsement of religion, is coercive of nonbelievers; government 
"must take pains not to compel people to act in the name of any 
religion."92 In both cases, the Court's concern with unequal 
treatment overshadows the fundamental free exercise mandate. 
This concern for "preferential treatment," whether framed 
as an equal protection or an establishment constraint, demon-
strates a troublesome insensitivity to free exercise interests. The 
need for free exercise accommodation arises when a neutral 
government policy or practice burdens a particular religious 
tenet. Government relief of that conflict should not raise a pref-
erence claim where the relief is the least restrictive alternative 
necessary to lift the burden.93 While the Connecticut statute 
may not have presented such an alternative, the distinction 
between burden and benefit fails to appear in the Thornton 
opinion. Instead, the Court focuses on the statute's failure to 
weigh convenience and other commercial interests against the 
Sabbath observer's free exercise claims-a failure which should 
not raise a genuine establishment problem or impinge on any 
other countervailing compelling interest. The Thornton Court 
does make an important but cursory reference to the putative 
benefit denied to other nonreligious employees.94 Aside from 
89 432 U.S. 63 (1977). 
90 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000eG), 2000e-2(a)(l) (1982). 
91 432 U.S. at 84. 
92 105 S. Ct. at 2917; see also, 105 S. Ct. at 2919 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The 
message conveyed is one of endorsement of a particular religious belief, to the detriment 
of those who do not share it."). 
93 See Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2504 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
94 See Thornton, 105 S. Ct. at 2918 n.9. 
An additional administrative question, which plagues all free exercise claims that 
raise economic issues, is implicated by the facts in Thornton. In cases where the relief 
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this, however, the Court's elevation of mere administrative or 
"convenience" interests over those of free exercise indicates a 
significant departure from the traditional standard requiring a 
compelling government interest to defeat free exercise claims.95 
Thornton and its predecessors thus suggest that less rigorous 
scrutiny now applies to conflicts between marketplace and re-
ligious interests.96 
Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor97 also demon-
strates this approach. A nonprofit religious organization, staffed 
by its members and deriving its income largely from operating 
commercial businesses, sought an exemption from minimum 
wage and other provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. 
The Court rejected the free exercise claim, finding no conflict 
between the Fair Labor Standards Act's requirement of mini-
mum benefits and the Alamo Foundation associates' religious 
principles, which prohibit receiving wages.98 
In Jensen v. Quaring,99 an equally divided Court affirmed 
an Eighth Circuit decision striking down a Nebraska driver's 
license statute which failed to provide a religious exemption 
from the law's photograph requirement. Even though Jensen 
concerned a direct government burden on religious practice, 
sought would be valued outside of the religious community, such as a day off in Thornton 
or an exemption from Social Security taxes, see United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 
(1982), the Court often denies the exemption because of the administrative inquiry that 
it asserts would be necessary to sort out sincere claims from fraudulent ones. See, e.g., 
Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 609: 
[T)here could well be the temptation for some, in order to keep their businesses 
open on Sunday, to assert that they have religious convictions which compel 
them to close their businesses on what had formerly been their least profitable 
day. This might make necessary a state-conducted inquiry into the sincerity of 
the individual's religious beliefs .... 
But see id. at 615 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (finding no problem with such an inquiry). 
?s See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 
398 (1963) (state may not deny unemployment compensation to Seventh-Day Adventist 
because of her refusal to accept employment requiring work on Saturdays); Prince v. 
Mass., 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (compelling government interest in protecting children 
overrides asserted free exercise claims concerning the use of child labor). 
96 See Thornton, 105 S. Ct. at 2918 ("Moreover, there is no exception when honoring 
the dictates of Sabbath observers would impose upon the employer substantial economic 
burdens or when the employer's compliance would require the imposition of significant 
burdens on other employees .... "). 
91 105 S. Ct. 1953 (1985). 
93 Id. at 1963. 
99 105 S. Ct. 3492. 
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and even though the requested exemption would likely not be 
a benefit desired by nonbelievers, as was arguably the case in 
Thornton and _4../amo, four Justices opposed the exemption. 
Thus, the Court's increasing deference to the legislature in free 
exercise cases may no longer be limited to concerns about dis-
parate economic benefits. If the administrative interest in avoid-
ing review of exemption applications satisfies four Supreme 
Court Justices, little appears to be left of the longstanding "com-
pelling interest" requirement protective of free exereise right~. 100 
III. The Search for Standards-Themes of the 
1984-85 Tenn101 
A. The Tradition Standard 
One theme underlying the 1984-85 religion cases is a con-
tinuing deference to "longstanding tradition," such as was used 
in Marsh and Lynch to uphold a legislative chaplaincy and a 
government-sponsored Nativity display. This reliance on a "tra-
dition" exception to stricter establishment review had been used 
earlier to sustain the state Blue Laws in McGowan v. 
Maryland102 and the tax exemptions for churches in Walz v. Tax 
Commission. 103 The tradition standard may have also supported 
more stringent free exercise review in Wisconsin v. Yoder. 104 
However, the Court's application of the tradition exception to 
the establishment concerns in Marsh and Lynch extended the 
scope of the exception. In Marsh, history was so controlling 
that the Court failed to engage in even the pro fonna establish-
ment review employed in Walz and McGowan. In Lynch, which 
extended the tradition of government accommodation of Christ-
mas to include government sponsorship of the Nativity display, 
100 See Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121, 1128 (8th Cir. 1984) (Fagg, J., 
dissenting). 
101 Because McCreary and Jensen both affirmed without opinion lower court rulings, 
and because of the marginal church-state nature of Alamo Foundation v. Dept. of Labor, 
the remainder of this discussion will deal almost exclusively with the decisions in Jaffree, 
Grand Rapids, Aguilar and Thornton. 
102 366 U.S. 420, 431-44 (1961). 
103 397 U.S. 664, 676-80 (1970). 
104 406 U.S. 205, 225-27 (1972) (comparing 200 years of Amish tradition with rela-
tively recent compulsory education). 
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the Court broadened the putative government "tradition" far 
beyond its historical roots. 105 
The Court apparently derives its tradition standard from a 
theory that examines the Founders' view of a challenged prac-
tice as the principal component of constitutional analysis. 106 This 
approach itself rests on a shaky foundation. 107 More importantly, 
it affords no establishment clause protection in those cases 
where it may be most necessary-where the practice at issue 
has promoted majoritarian interests for years without challenge. 
Although the key 1984-85 religion cases upheld the estab-
lishment challenges, the opinions did not retreat from this tra-
dition standard. The 200 years of tradition that supported the 
legislative chaplains in Marsh simply did not exist for the public 
school prayer in Jaffree. 108 As Justice O'Connor notes, public 
schools were not even in existence at the time of the Founders, 
so reconstruction of their opinions on the permissibility of 
school prayer should be immaterial. 109 
The Jaffree dissenting opinions also rely on an historical 
basis for school prayer. Both Chief Justice Burger and Justice 
Rehnquist ground their arguments in support of school prayer 
on the history of publicly sponsored congressional prayer and 
on presidential Thanksgiving Day proclamations, 110 failing to 
distinguish between the long history of legislative prayer and 
the shorter history of public school prayer. 
105 See Teitel, Book Review, 2 Const. Commentary 529 (1985). 
106 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 1359-60. 
107 See Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 
885, 939-41 (1985); see also Stevens, J., Address to the Federal Bar Ass'n (Oct. 23, 
1985) (on file with the Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review); Brennan, J., 
Address to Georgetown University (Oct. 12, 1985) (on file with the Harvard CivilRights-
Civil Liberties Law Review). 
103 See 105 S. Ct. at 2494 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 2502 (O'Connor, J., 
concurring). This distinction was also noted by the majority opinion in Grand Rapids, 
105 S. Ct. at 3226 n.9. The Court in Jaffree did not address the point directly. It did, 
however, review history to examine and reject the claim that the establishment clause 
serves only to protect against orthodoxy or preference among Christian sects. See 105 
S. Ct. at 2488. 
10? 105 S. Ct. at 2503 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
11o See id. at 2505 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2508-16, 2520 (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
The historical argument extends to its broadest parameters in Justice Rehnquist's 
opinion. His dissent in Jaffree is based on the legislative history of the religion clauses. 
Rehnquist contends that the history of the establishment clause reveals a prohibition 
only against designation of a national church and assertion of official preference of one 
church over another. 
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The Grand Rapids, Aguilar and Thornton opinions do not 
explicitly rely on historical arguments. 111 However, the lack of 
a tradition for the specific statute at stake in Thornton may 
explain why the Court invalidated that statute as a preferential 
establishment of religion when it is unwilling to overturn the 
traditional Blue Laws that favor only Christian Sabbath 
observers. 
B. The Protection of Children Standard 
For years, schools have been battlegrounds for competing 
church and state interests in controlling the education of chil-
dren.112 Jaffree, Grand Rapids and Aguilar reflect the Court's 
continued application of heightened scrutiny in establishment 
challenges when the recipients of the aid are public and private 
school children. While J affree, Grand Rapids and Aguilar each 
invalidated government sponsorship under different prongs of 
the tripartite Lemon standard, 113 a theme in all three opinions is 
the special protection accorded to school children. This empha-
sis derives from the Court's concern with children's perception 
of government aid. On the assumption that children are less able 
to distinguish between government sponsorship and neutral-
ity, 114 the Court has prohibited certain practices in public schools 
that have survived constitutional scrutiny when performed in 
other public institutions.115 
111 Justice Rehnquist, in his Grand Rapids dissent, does rely cursorily on the "first 
150 years of the Establishment Clause" as putative historical support for government 
assistance to religious schools. 105 S. Ct. at 3232. 
112 See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 
(1980); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Committee for Public Educ. v. Nyquist, 
413 U.S. 756 (1973); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 
403 U.S. 602 (1971); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. 
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948). 
113 The Court relied on the religious purpose of the Alabama silent prayer statute, 
Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2492-93; the effect of the State parochial program in Grand Rapids, 
105 S. Ct. at 3222-23; and the excessive entanglement of the statutory supervision 
provisions in Aguilar, 105 S. Ct. at 3237. 
114 See infra text accompanying notes 159-64. 
us The Court has, for instance, permitted government practices such as organized 
prayer and funding for religious displays and institutions involving adults, while barring 
similar government activity involving children. Compare Lynch, 465 U.S. 668 (sustaining 
government-sponsored Christmas display); Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792 (sustaining legislative 
prayer by distinguishing between adults not susceptible to "religious indoctrination" and 
children subject to "peer presssure"); Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274 n.14 (university students 
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This theme is particularly apparent in the Grand Rapids 
opinion, which centers on the parochial school child's percep-
tion of public school instructors teaching on parochial school 
premises. 116 The Court concluded that this form of government 
aid advances religion in three ways. First, teachers offering 
instruction on the premises of the pervasively religious schools 
might inculcate religion. 117 Second, there is a symbolic link be-
tween government and religion when students see public school 
employees teaching in parochial schools. 118 Finally, the Court 
found that such programs might, in effect, subsidize religion 
since the schools were the beneficiaries of the aid. 119 
C. "Imprimatur" or Perception of Aid Standards 
In deciding the 1984-85 establishment cases, the Court con-
tinued to apply an analysis based on perception of government 
aid. This concern with perception influences the tradition stan-
dard and the protection of children standard described above. 
Thus, the Court sustained government aid in Lynch and Marsh 
because years of community approval indicated a perception 
that the challenged practices were part of a larger cultural tra-
dition. Conversely, it prohibited government aid in Jaffree, 
Grand Rapids and Aguilar largely because it doubted the ability 
of children to distinguish neutral support from religious endorse-
ment. This theme has also influenced the weakening of the 
Lemon test. 120 
"are less impressionable than younger students," and should be able to appreciate that 
the university's policy is one of neutrality toward religion); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 
U.S. 672, 685-86 (1971) (distinguishing university students as less impressionable and 
less susceptible to religious indoctrination) with Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 775-77 (barring 
financing for repair and maintenance of parochial school); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 
80 (1980) (striking down law requiring display of Ten Commandments on public school 
walls); Engel, 370 U.S. 421 (barring teacher-led school prayer). 
116 105 S. Ct. at 3223-24. 
117 Id. at 3224-26. Interestingly, the Court discounted the absence of evidence of 
such inculcation in the record, reasoning that young children, who were the beneficiaries 
of the instruction, were likely to be incapable of detecting this impermissible effect. 
This point emphasizes the significance of the Court's choice of "perceiver" in its 
analysis. See infra text accompanying notes 158-74. 
118 Id. at 3227 ("In this environment, the students would be unlikely to discern the 
crucial difference between the religious school and 'public-school' classes, even if the 
latter were successfully kept free of religious indoctrination."). 
119 Id. at 3223-24. 
120 See infra text accompanying notes 131-74. 
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The Court's concern with the "imprimatur" or appearance 
of government approval of aid to religion is part of an analytical 
framework with dangerous implications. Incorporating com-
munity perception into the religion clause standard of review 
threatens the independent role of judicial review. This "impri-
matur" test, combined with formalistic tests concerning the di-
rection and context of the aid, 121 allows government aid to re-
ligion to escape constitutional scrutiny so long as the community 
as a whole accepts the practice. This judicial acceptance of the 
fact of government aid conflicts with the Court's assertions that 
religious liberty extends to protect nonbelievers from coer-
cion. 122 Most troubling is the supposed objectivity of the en-
dorsement test. The determinative question is whose percep-
tions will govern. Focusing on perceptions, especially 
"objective" perceptions, ultimately endangers the religious mi-
norities whose rights were intended to be the central focus of 
the religion clauses. 
IV. The Weakened Lemon Test 
The 1984-85 Term witnessed an unsurprising reappearance 
of the Lemon establishment test. While eschewed in the previ-
ous Term's "tradition" cases, the test had been consistently 
applied in cases involving religion in the schools.123 Cases in-
volving school children formed a substantial part of the 1984-
85 religion docket, and the remaining cases failed to present a 
"tradition" alternative. The current version of the test, however, 
is a weak shadow of the original. At best, it will ferret out 
government aid intended exclusively for a religious purpose, as 
the Court found expressly in J affree and implicitly in Thornton. 
Where the government aid has a mixed purpose, the new Lemon 
test has virtually no impact, since only some secular purpose is 
required. The Court will probably sustain the aid if it considers 
it sufficiently "indirect" or if it is sandwiched in an array of 
other nonreligious aid-unless the perceivers of that aid are 
children, who have an arguably diminished capacity to distin-
121 See infra text accompanying notes 135-57. 
122 See, e.g., Grand Rapids, 105 S. Ct. at 3222-23. 
123 See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983). 
672 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 21 
guish between government aid for secular purposes and aid for 
religious purposes. 
A. Evolution of the Purpose Prong 
The first prong of the Lemon test asks whether government 
aid has a religious purpose. In the 1973 case of Committee for 
Public Education v. Nyquist, the Court applied this test strictly, 
evaluating a parochiaid statute by looking for a "clearly secular" 
legislative purpose. 124 Lynch weakened this "secular purpose" 
inquiry when it held that any secular purpose could save gov-
ernment legislation that is primarily intended to advance reli-
gion.125 As applied in Jaffree, the majority and concurring opin-
ions stress that it is the absence of any secular purpose for 
Alabama's silent prayer statute which invalidates the 
legislation.126 
Thus, under the new interpretation of the Lemon test, leg-
islation need only have one secular purpose to withstand estab-
lishment review. Under this minimal purpose inquiry, almost all 
government aid to religion would be permissible, even if such 
aid goes beyond the type of historically sanctioned aid to religion 
upheld in Lynch and Marsh. Moreover, O'Connor's Jaffree con-
currence argues that the Court's inquiry must be "deferential" 
and "limited" to the legislature's "stated intent."127 
This minimal purpose inquiry appears to be mere pro forma 
judicial review.128 The Court should not uphold a statute on the 
basis of a legislative declaration of a single secular purpose. 
Rather, it should probe deeply into the legislative motivation. 
A mere "avowed" secular purpose ought not be sufficient to 
save a statute passed with the intent to aid religion. 129 The 
12• 413 U.S. 756, 775 (1973). 
12s 465 U.S. at 681. 
126 105 S. Ct. at 2492; id. at 2500 (O'Connor J., concurring); id. at 2495 (Powell, J., 
concurring). O'Connor's "endorsement" test also examines the purpose of legislation, 
to determine whether it is intended to convey a message of endorsement. See id. at 
2497 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
127 Id. at 2500. 
128 See id. at 2517 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The purpose prong means little if it 
only requires the legislature to express any secular purpose and omit all sectarian 
references ..•• "). 
129 See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980). 
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Court's refusal to scrutinize legislative purpose is especially 
ominous in the evolution of the school prayer statutes. So long 
as any singular secular purpose is apparent, a moment of silence 
statute would likely pass the Court's minimal purpose inquiry.130 
B. The "Imprimatur" Effect Test 
The effect prong of the Lemon test has traditionally distin-
guished aid having a "primary effect" of advancing religion from 
aid having an "indirect" or "incidental" effect. 131 In Grand Rap-
ids and Thornton, the Court did strike down government aid 
which had the primary effect of advancing religion. 132 These 
cases weakened the Lemon effect test, however, by their em-
phasis on imprimatur or perception of endorsement. 133 The 
Court focused on whether, given the objective context of the 
government aid and the subjective perception by the recipients, 
the aid was likely to be interpreted as a government message of 
endorsement of religion. 134 In applying the objective portion of 
this test, the Court upheld the aid where it was not provided 
directly to the religious institution or where it was submerged 
in an array of other, nonreligious beneficiaries. 
1. Objective Imprimatur: Form and Context 
a. Directness of Aid 
The parochiaid schemes in Grand Rapids and Aguilar pro-
vided public financing of teaching in private religious schools. 
130 This question has plagued the courts in other moment of silence cases. See, 
e.g., May v. Cooperman, 780 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1985) (striking down moment of silence 
statute); see also Walter v. West Virginia Bd. of Educ., 610 F. Supp. 1169 (S.D. W. Va. 
1985) (striking down moment of silence statute which explicitly referred to prayer). 
m See Roemer v. Md. Public Works, 426 U.S. 736, 758 (1976); Nyquist, 413 U.S. 
at 771; Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 742-43 (1973). 
132 See Grand Rapids, 105 S. Ct. at 3226-27; Thornton, 105 S. Ct. at 2918. 
133 Compare Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. l, 16 (1947) (establishment clause 
was intended to erect a wall of separation between church and state) with Jaffree, 105 
S. Ct. at 2497 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (establishment clause precludes statutes whose 
purpose and effect go against the grain of protected religious liberties). 
134 See Grand Rapids, 105 S. Ct. at 3226; Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2490; Lynch, 465 
U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274. 
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Rejecting arguments that this aid benefitted only the children, 135 
the Court held the "on premises" programs to be unconstitu-
tional "direct" aid to religious institutions. 136 The directness of 
the aid distinguished these programs from the tax deductions in 
Mueller which went to parents of parochial school children. The 
private decisionmaking stressed in Mueller was central again in 
Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind, 131 
the first church-state decision of the 1985-86 Term. In Witters, 
the Court upheld vocational assistance for a blind man to train 
for the ministry at a religious college because the final decision 
to attend the religious institution rested with the individual. 138 
This emphasis on the directness of the aid entails a formal-
istic inquiry which reflects the Court's concern with appear-
ances. Whether a check is made out to a religious school or to 
a parent of a child attending that religious school, the source of 
the aid is the govemment139 and the ultimate beneficiaries are 
religious institutions which will be using the aid for religious 
purposes. The existence of a "middleman" should be irrelevant 
to the constitutional inquiry. 
b. Presence of an Array of Beneficiaries 
The presence or absence of an array of beneficiaries-reli-
gious and nonreligious alike-has emerged as another crucial 
factor in the new Lemon effect analysis. The Court appears to 
be convinced that aid to religion constitutes "neutrality" when 
it is extended to nonreligious beneficiaries as well, notwithstand-
ing that the establishment clause necessitates different consti-
tutional standards for aid to religious as opposed to nonreligious 
recipients. Prior parochiaid cases, for example, had sustained 
13
' Brief amicus curiae of the United States at 15, Grand Rapids; Brief amicus 
curiae of the United States at 16, Aguilar. 
136 See Grand Rapids, 105 S. Ct. at 3228; Aguilar, 105 S. Ct. at 3241 (Powell, J., 
concurring). 
131 106 S. Ct. at 752. 
138 Id. at 752. 
139 Indeed, this was acknowledged in Grand Rapids. See 105 S. Ct. at 3228 (noting 
that in Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973) and Nyquist the Court struck down programs 
where the aid was formally given to parents because "these differences in form were 
insufficient to save programs whose effect was indistinguishable from that of a direct 
subsidy to religious schools"). 
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government provision of buses and textbooks when the aid was 
offered to both religious and nonreligious school children. 140 In 
recent terms, this factor developed into a central inquiry. In 
Widmar, the Court held that the presence of an array of bene-
ficiaries, including many secular clubs, diminished the likelihood 
that the challenged student religion club would have the effect 
of advancing religion. 141 In Lynch, the Court relied on a variation 
of this array analysis, upholding the Nativity display which was 
literally within an array of secular Christmas symbols.142 In 
Mueller, the Court upheld tax deductions to defray educational 
expenses because the benefits were theoretically available to an 
array of religious and secular beneficiaries-parents of both 
parochial and public school children.143 
Conversely, the absence in Grand Rapids, Aguilar and 
Thornton of an array of beneficiaries appears to be central to 
the Court's invalidation of the government aid. Grand Rapids 
and Aguilar involved assistance that primarily benefitted paro-
chial school children. 144 Likewise, the Court in Thornton em-
phasized that the Sabbath observer was the sole beneficiary of 
the Connecticut statute.145 
The presence of an array of beneficiaries, religious and 
nonreligious, undeniably lessens the perception of government 
aid. Yet the centrality of the array factor in the Court's effect 
analysis threatens the vitality of establishment review. A sta-
tutory scheme may boast a secular array which is false or en-
tirely hypothetical, designed to mask the fact that the aid is 
going exclusively to religion. For example, while the program 
in Aguilar would aid low income children of all schools, public 
and private, the great majority of private schools benefitting 
140 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 
330 U.S. 1 (1947). See also Mueller, 463 U.S. at 398 n.8, citing Tilton and Walz as 
examples of aid accorded to all educational and charitable non-profit institutions. 
141 454 U.S. at 274. Cf Grand Rapids, 105 S. Ct. at 3226. See Teitel, The Uncon-
stitutionality of Equal Access Policies and Legislation Allowing Organized Student-
Initiated Religious Activities in the Public High Schools: A Proposal for a Unitary First 
Amendment Forum Analysis, 12 Hastings Const. L.Q. 529 (1985). 
142 See 465 U.S. at 671. 
143 463 U.S. at 398. 
144 See Aguilar, 105 S. Ct. at 3235; Grand Rapids, 105 S. Ct. at 3223. But see Brief 
amicus curiae of the United States at 14, Grand Rapids; Brief amicus curiae of the 
United States at 16, Aguilar. 
14s 105 S. Ct. at 2917-18. 
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from the federal funding were parochial. 146 McCreary posed a 
similar false array problem. While the public traffic circle park 
was theoretically available for religious and nonreligious ex-
pression, over the years most of the beneficiaries were propo-
nents of religious displays.141 
This false array problem demonstrates the necessity that 
any array be preexisting, like the one in Widmar, in order to 
diminish the imprimatur of government aid. Finding itself in a 
dilemma of its own making, the Court appears to be struggling 
with this issue. In Mueller, the Court found the patently hypo-
thetical array sufficient to diminish imprimatur148 whereas in 
Grand Rapids and Aguilar, it did not. 149 Jaffree also highlights 
these difficulties; although Justice O'Connor's concurrence sug-
gests that moment of silence legislation which provides for silent 
prayer as one of an array of alternatives would be constitu-
tional, iso such an array is exactly what was provided by the 
Alabama statute as amended to allow for "meditation or prayer." 
In striking down the statute, the Court in essence held that 
Alabama had provided a false array. 
A more fundamental problem with the array approach is 
the extent to which religious and nonreligious beneficiaries may 
be treated equally. The Court's current approach obfuscates 
what, if anything, the first amendment religion clauses say about 
this matter. Clearly, some forms of government aid may be 
provided on an equal basis; most would agree that police and 
fire protection ought to be offered to churches on the same basis 
as to secular institutions. It does not follow, however, that tax 
monies may be divided equally among public and parochial 
schools.1s1 A distinction should be drawn between provision of 
secular government services and provision of other government 
services which may advance religious goals. Services such as 
146 105 S. Ct. at 3235-36. 
147 See McCreary v. Stone, 575 F. Supp. 1112, 1115-16, 1123-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
148 463 U.S. at 397. Cf. id. at 400 n.9 (Minn. Dept. of Revenue reported that only 
taxpayers with dependents in nonpublic schools benefitted); id. at 405 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
149 The difference may have been determined by other effect factors, such as the 
directness of the aid-deductions to parents were upheld in Mueller; on-premises aid 
was struck down in Grand Rapids and Aguilar. 
uo 105 S. Ct. at 2501. 
1s1 See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 260 (Brennan, J., concuning). 
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police and fire protection retain their secular nature even when 
provided to a religious beneficiary.152 Once government funds 
are provided to a religious institution, though, they may be 
diverted to advance religion, 153 violating basic establishment 
principles. Furthermore, such funding conflicts with the Court's 
asserted concern for protecting the liberty of disbelievers; when 
tax funds are doled out to religious institutions, there is auto-
matic coercion of nonadherents. 154 Because the Court did not 
even mention this taxpayer coercion in Grand Rapids and Agui-
lar, such coercion apparently no longer concerns it. 
Thus the Court's emphasis on arrays undercuts the estab-
lishment clause mandate that religion be treated differently from 
secular concerns. The array standard similarly jeopardizes free 
exercise accommodation principles which would assist only re-
ligious beneficiaries.155 This is apparent in Thornton, where the 
Court sought to equate religious and secular interests. 156 The 
array standard brings to the fore the conflict between principles 
of equality and the religion clauses' mandate of different, special 
treatment for religion. 157 
2. Subjective Imprimatur-The Observer of 
Government Aid 
The subjective aspect of the Court's new endorsement ap-
proach centers on the perception of the government aid. This 
concern with perceptions reflects a view of government assis-
tance to religion as a two-way street. A message of government 
endorsement is the result of a dialogue between government and 
observers of government assistance. 158 This raises the question 
of whose perception is determinative. Where children are in-
152 At least one Justice has employed this distinction. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 643 
(Brennan, J., concurring) (distinguishing impermissible public funding in Lemon from 
reimbursement for bus fare in Everson and loan of textbooks in Allen). 
153 See, e.g., Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 106 S. Ct. 752 (1986). 
154 See Engel, 370 U.S. at 444 (Douglas, J., concurring); Everson, 330 U.S. at 
15-16. " 
iss See Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2504 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
156 See 105 S. Ct. at 2918. 
157 See Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2504 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
158 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (''The meaning of a 
statement to its audience depends both on the intention of the speaker and on the 
'objective' meaning of the statement in the community."). 
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volved, their perceptions trigger a heightened scrutiny. In other 
cases, the issue revolves around the perceptions of the non-
adherent versus the perceptions of the public at large. 
a. Lemon and the Children 
Historically, many forms of government assistance to reli-
gion, sustained as to adults, have been barred on school prem-
ises where children are the perceivers of the government in-
volvement with religion. 159 In Marsh, for example, the Court 
emphasized that "the individual claiming injury by the practice 
is an adult, presumably not readily susceptible to 'religious 
indoctrination' ... or peer pressure."160 Children, on the other 
hand, may be unable to distinguish between government spon-
sorship and neutrality. Due to their inexperience and impres-
sionability, it is difficult for them to differentiate government aid 
for a secular purpose from aid for a religious purpose. 161 
Jaffree, Grand Rapids and Aguilar reflect this concern for 
children's perceptions of a symbolic link between government 
and religion. In Grand Rapids and Aguilar, the Court held that, 
while the respective state and federal legislatures did not intend 
to endorse religion, the teachers involved in the aid programs 
would nonetheless convey this message to children. This would 
be true regardless of the nature of the teacher's involvement, 
given the children's youth and impressionability. 162 
Jaffree also evidences concern for the school child's per-
ceptions. While the Court focuses on the exclusively religious 
purpose intended by the legislature, rendering inquiry into the 
statute's effect unnecessary, the opinion reiterates the special 
difficulties the school child encounters in distinguishing between 
neutrality and sponsorship. 163 Accordingly, the impressionability 
of school children continues to elevate the level of judicial pro-
tection against government coercion of individual religious 
freedom. 164 
1
'9 See supra note 115. 
160 463 U.S. at 792. 
161 See Grand Rapids, 105 S. Ct. at 3224-27; Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222. 
162 See Grand Rapids, 105 S. Ct. at 3227; Aguilar, 105 S. Ct. at 3237-38. 
163 105 S. Ct. at 242 n.51. 
164 Compulsory school attendance also heightens the concern with coercion. See 
Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2503 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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b. The O'Connor Endorsement Test: "Nonadherent" vs. 
the "Populace at Large" 
The Court has gone beyond this concern for children, using 
the perception standard in other contexts as well. Although 
Justice O'Connor first proposed the "endorsement" inquiry in 
her Lynch concurrence, 165 a majority of the Court now appears 
to recognize it. 166 The key question in this conceptual framework 
is the source of the relevant perception, and the 1984-85 cases 
reflect the Court's struggle to respond. 
The choice is between the minority "nonadherent" and the 
"reasonable person" or the "public at large"; the decision among 
them affects the nature of judicial review. O'Connor's initial 
choice in determining the relevant observer of endorsement was 
the minority nonadherent. This standard, first expressed in 
Lynch161 and referred to in Jaffree, 168 appears to be properly 
grounded in the basic constitutional concern with protection of 
minority religious rights. 169 While the standard of inquiry is 
correct, however, the Lynch result itself indicates the danger 
arising from judicial use of perception tests. Despite Justice 
O'Connor's rhetoric adopting the vantage point of a minority 
nonadherent, she concluded that government sponsorship of a 
Nativity display merely endorses a cultural symbol and fails to 
convey an impermissible message to nonadherents. 170 This con-
clusion reflects majoritarian rather than minority "nonadherent" 
thinking, and the Lynch decision ultimately stands for the es-
sence of establishment: the conversion to "culture" of the ma-
jority religion. 
In the 1984-85 Term, Justice O'Connor made passing ref-
erence to her Lynch nonadherent standard, 171 but moved on to 
165 465 U.S. at 690-94. 
166 See Grand Rapids, 105 S. Ct. at 3226 ("[A]n important concern of the effects 
test is whether the symbolic union of church and state effected by the challenged 
governmental action is sufficiently likely to be perceived by adherents of the controlling 
denominations as an endorsement, and by the non-adherents as a disapproval, of their 
individual religious choices."); Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2490 (quoting tests from O'Connor's 
Lynch concurrence). 
•
67 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
168 105 S. Ct. at 2497 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
169 See id. at 2497. 
110 465 U.S. at 692-93. 
171 See Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2497 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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adopt the vantage point of the reasonable person, the "objective 
observer" or the "public at large."172 Under this standard, she 
determined that moment of silence legislation fails to engender 
messages of endorsement. 173 On the other hand, she found that 
minority Sabbath observers' time off in Thornton sent a message 
of endorsement to majority nonobservant workers. 174 
These holdings raise serious questions about the indepen-
dent role of judicial establishment review. Since the "public at 
large" has already expressed its views through the legislative 
process, judicial adoption of a "public at large" standard for 
examining legislation provides no review at all. More important, 
the endorsement standard will not protect religious minorities. 
Where government aid to religion is at stake, the objective 
observer is deemed not to perceive a message of endorsement; 
yet where a burden on free exercise is claimed, as in Thornton, 
accommodation may be denied because others will see it as an 
endorsement. The truly objective observer would seem to reach 
opposite results. Thus the conclusions drawn by O'Connor dem-
onstrate the danger that any such endorsement or perception 
standard may be twisted to serve as a tool which supports 
majoritarian ends. 
C. The Lemon Entanglement Concern 
As originally devised, the Lemon test provided that state 
entanglement with religion in the administration of government 
aid constituted an independent establishment clause violation. 
The comprehensive inquiry examined the extent of financial and 
administrative entanglement as well as political divisiveness re-
sulting from the aid. 175 In recent years, the Court has substan-
tially limited the entanglement inquiry. In Lynch and Mueller, 
the Court indicated that the entanglement test would generally 
focus solely on administrative entanglement-the extent of on-
in See Thornton, 105 S. Ct. at 2919 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 
at 2501 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
113 Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2501. But see May v. Cooperman, 572 F. Supp. 1561 
(D.N.J. 1983) (emphasizing effect of moments of silence on nonbelievers), aff'd, 780 
F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1985). 
114 105 S. Ct. at 2919. 
115 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619-20, 622-24. 
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going government monitoring of religious affairs. 176 Mueller in-
dicated that the concern over political divisiveness would be 
limited to those cases involving direct financing to religious 
institutions. 177 
Despite these recent limitations, the entanglement test 
showed renewed vitality in the 1984-85 Term. The importance 
of the entanglement concern as an independent test was crucial 
to the Court's evaluation of religion in the school cases. 178 How-
ever, consideration of administrative entanglement as an inde-
pendent establishment evil is a double-edged sword. Separation 
of government and religion necessarily requires some ongoing 
government surveillance. 179 The point is to distinguish between 
government involvement in the service of constitutional protec-
tions and entanglement arising from unconstitutional govern-
ment promotion of religion. 
V. Conceptual Problems: Establishment vs. Free Exercise 
. The Court's approach in the 1984-85 opinions indicates 
serious conceptual difficulties that portend future problems. The 
central issue is the extent to which the first amendment allows 
government intentionally to aid religion. The analysis employed 
in these cases reflects the vitality of the new accommodation 
doctrine, which blurs establishment and free exercise concerns 
and eviscerates the first amendment religion clause analysis. 
This accommodation doctrine, especially as applied in 
Thornton and J affree, responds to the recently fashionable, but 
largely semantic, construction of the religion clauses which has 
176 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 684; Mueller, 463 U.S. at 403 n.11. 
m 463 U.S. at 403 n.11. 
178 Aguilar, for example, indicates that where there is a paucity of evidence of 
religious effect the Court may look to evidence of extensive government involvement 
aimed at averting promotion of religion. 105 S. Ct. at 3239. In addition to Aguilar's 
concern over unconstitutional entanglement, the case posed the precise scenario of 
political divisiveness contemplated in Mueller; 463 U.S. at 403 n.11. Justice Powell 
devoted the substance of his Aguilar concurrence to the political divisiveness problems 
presented by direct financial aid to religious institutions. See 105 S. Ct. at 3240-41. 
179 See Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741F.2d538, 556 (3d Cir. 1984), 
rev'd on other grounds, 54 U.S.L.W. 4307 (1986); see also Mueller, 463 U.S. at 403. 
But see Widmar, 454 U.S. at 272 n.11 (unconstitutional entanglement results from 
university having to determine "which words and activities fall within 'religious 
worship"'). 
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produced an artificial tension between their two mandates. Ac-
cording to this somewhat pedantic reading of the clauses, if a 
governmental religious purpose is automatically invalid under 
the Lemon test, all free exercise accommodations are constitu-
tionally flawed, since they are intended to facilitate religious 
belief or practice. 180 Indeed, this reasoning appears to underlie 
the Thornton analysis, although the Court could not explicitly 
overturn the statute on religious purpose grounds without jeop-
ardizing all future free exercise accommodations. Instead, the 
Court referred to other putative establishment concerns which 
are nonetheless characteristic of all legitimate free exercise ac-
commodations-the effects of these accommodations on the 
perceptions of others. 
Jaffree posed the inverse problem-a statute which did not 
present a free exercise accommodation responsive to a burden, 
but which, as in Thornton, did have an exclusively religious 
purpose. Because there was no burden necessitating accom-
modation, the Court held that the statute's religious purpose 
raised establishment problems. The difference in the Jaffree and 
Thornton analyses indicates that the religious purpose test may 
not end the constitutional inquiry, lest all genuine free exercise 
accommodations be similarly tainted. This dilemma is not amel-
iorated by the minimalist purpose inquiry employed in J affree. 
Ironically, the "exclusively religious purpose" standard invali-
dates government-legislated free exercise accommodations, 
while permitting, so long as there is any secular purpose, un-
necessary government promotion of religion. As currently ap-
plied, therefore, the Lemon purpose inquiry fails to serve either 
religion clause mandate. 
Another unnecessary tension between establishment and 
free exercise concerns is posed by the subjective imprimatur, 
or endorsement, test. At this point, a religious purpose would 
not, in itself, pose constitutional problems; some perception of 
government aid, together with the intention to convey that en-
dorsement, seems necessary. Such an appearance of govern-
1eo See, e.g., Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2504 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also Choper, 
The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. Pitt. L. 
Rev. 673 (1980); G. Goldberg, Reconsecrating America (1984); Brief amicus curiae of 
the United States, Jaffree. 
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ment endorsement is diluted by the Court's receptivity to arrays 
of aid which benefit both religion and nonreligion. This signals 
the end of special treatment for religion181 and allows govern-
ment to promote religion as it does secular concerns.182 
Several alternatives have been offered to respond to the 
artificial tension between the two religion clause mandates 
caused by the present application of the Lemon test. One ap-
proach would reduce the tension by limiting the reach of one or 
both clauses. The establishment mandate, for example, may be 
limited by reading "religion" more narrowly for establishment 
purposes than for free exercise purposes. 183 Alternatively, the 
scope of free exercise concerns may be limited by allowing only 
those accommodations necessary to lift burdens imposed by 
government, not those imposed by private parties. 184 
Another approach, that of finding a unifying theme for both 
mandates, is epitomized by the new accommodation doctrine, 
which seeks to draw support from the tension rather than to 
limit it. The religion clauses are read against each other, with 
the conclusion that the Founders could not have intended gov-
ernment accommodations to be antithetical to the establishment 
clause. From this, a unifying theme is drawn which would allow 
a variety of government accommodations, whether or not they 
respond to actual burdens.185 As shown above, however, this 
approach results in a substitution of legislative judgments for 
judicial review. Another unifying theme which has been offered 
is that of "neutrality," under which the religion clauses are read 
together to prohibit both burdens on, and benefits to, religion. 186 
This proposal would be unworkable in practice; a "benefit" 
181 This hearkens back to the Court's "neutrality" principle. See Everson, 330 U.S. 
at 15-16; Brief for Petitioner at 10, Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 54 
U .S.L.W. 4307 (1986) (seeking "equal treatment" for religious and non-religious groups). 
m This attitude fails to recognize the historical commitment to treating religion 
differently, which arises because "religion is too personal, too sacred, too holy •... " 
Engel, 370 U.S. at 432. 
183 L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 832-33 (1978). 
184 See Thornton, 105 S. Ct. at 2919 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
185 See McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 6 (forthcom-
ing) (arguing for a "framework that acknowledges the legitimacy of encouraging and 
facilitating religious liberty," and criticizing the Court for applying conflicting approaches 
to free exercise cases and establishment cases). 
186 See Kurland, The I"elevance of the Constitution: The Religion Clauses of the 
First Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 Vill. L. Rev. 3, 24 (1978). 
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banned by the establishment clause might still be required under 
free exercise. 
The difficulty in reconciling the putative clash between the 
two religion clauses does not, however, render incomprehensi-
ble the dual religion clause mandate or the Lemon inquiry. The 
ostensibly invalid religious purpose of free exercise accommo-
dation statutes and the perception of such a purpose by non-
adherents should survive establishment scrutiny because there 
is a compelling interest posed by free exercise rights. The es-
tablishment scrutiny should not be diluted by free exercise con-
cerns, but should rather follow a two-step analysis. First, the 
Court should subject the statute to the Lemon inquiry, looking 
for an intent and effect of aiding religion. Second, the Court 
should inquire whether the accommodation is responsive to a 
government burden on religion or is required by another con-
stitutionally compelling interest. J affree did hold that there was 
no such government burden to be alleviated;187 this passing 
acknowledgment in the Court's opinion and in O'Connor's con-
currence signals a potential check on the accommodation doc-
trine and false collisions between free exercise and establish-
ment protections. 
In conclusion, this Article contends that, rather than a doc-
trinal retreat from accommodation doctrine, the Court's hold-
ings in the seven religion cases of the 1984-85 Term demonstrate 
a continuing abdication of judicial review resulting in deference 
to majoritarian legislation. Holdings that seem to signal a return 
to former standards are actually very narrow, tracking control-
ling precedent. Moreover, the standards implemented by the 
Court are formalistic, and traditional forms of government aid 
to religion are given only perfunctory review. This formalistic 
approach results in judicial support for government promotion 
of majoritarian religion under the guise of cultural traditions. 
Similarly, free exercise accommodations of minority religion 
interests are defeated by almost any countervailing majoritarian 
interests of administration or convenience. Such judicial defer-
ence to legislative decisions about religion threatens the inde-
pendent role of judicial review and jeopardizes the fundamental 
187 105 S. Ct. at 2491 n.45; see also id. at 2505 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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liberties of religious minorities-those who are most in need of 
first amendment protection. 
VI. Epilogue 
The Court is not likely to retreat in the near future from 
the standards apparent in the 1984-85 cases. Indeed, the 1985-
86 Term has perpetuated these trends, and other cases soon to 
be decided may be expected to follow suit. These cases continue 
to call upon the Court· to choose between conflicting standards 
of perception, demonstrating the problems with the endorse-
ment approach to religion clause review. 
In Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the 
Blind, 188 the Court balanced an array of assertedly indirect gov-
ernment aid to nonreligious beneficiaries with the longstanding 
principle opposing government aid to a religious institution for 
a religious purpose. The Court ruled that an individual's use of 
state vocational rehabilitation funding to study for the ministry 
did not have the effect of advancing religion. Because the Court 
saw the aid as indirect, viewing the program as a whole rather 
than focusing solely on Witters' use of the funding, it is not 
surprising that the Court found no constitutional violatiop.. 
Bender v. Williamsport Area School District189 involved free 
speech. and establishment concerns posed by a high school 
prayer club. The perception concern raised by children who 
observed the prayer clubs on school premises was pitted against 
an alleged array of nonreligious student clubs. Thus the subjec-
tive "religion in the schools" standard competed with the newer 
emphasis on objective "arrays" or "equal access" for religion 
and nonreligion. While the majority sidestepped the substantive 
issues because of standing problems, the issues are likely to 
resurface in the future. The conflict between the recently en-
acted Equal Access Act190 and the unanimity among the courts 
1ss 106 S. Ct. 748 (1986). 
189 54 U.S.L.W. 4307 (1986) (vacating judgment due to lack of standing of school 
board member). 
190 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 4071-74 (Supp. 1986). The Equal Access Act was enacted to 
allow student religious groups to operate on public secondary school premises to the 
same extent as other noncurricular student groups. 
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of appeals, barring such clubs on constitutional grounds, 191 will 
require Supreme Court resolution. In determining which per-
ception standard will govern, the Court must decide whether 
the government sponsorship involved in a high school prayer 
club is more like teacher-led school prayer in the elementary 
schools or like the Widmar university prayer club situations. 
Indeed, the Bender dissents, which reached the merits, held 
Widmar to be controlling. 192 In light of Grand Rapids and Agui-
lar, future resolution of the issues raised in Bender may tum on 
the nature of teacher supervision of the student-initiated prayer 
clubs. Extensive teacher involvement, coupled with the absence 
of a true array, 193 could result in a decision against such a prayer 
club. 
Four other cases highlight the problems with the analysis 
employed by the Court in Thornton. They raise the issue of the 
extent to which government must accommodate free exercise 
claims in the face of other government policy interests, alleged 
establishment problems and other constitutional concerns. 
These cases involve the availability of exemptions which might 
be desirable to others, as is true of almost all free exercise 
claims. Because of this, the Thornton perception standard is 
inadequate, and the Court must look toward the nature of the 
countervailing governmental interest. Unless the Court finds a 
less restrictive alternative responsive to the government's con-
cerns, it is likely to allow almost any governmental interest to 
override religious liberty rights, as it did in Alamo and Lee. 
Goldman v. Weinberger194 involved a free exercise claim by 
an Orthodox Jew who sought to wear a skullcap (yarmulke) 
191 In addition to the Third Circuit, whose judgment in Bender, 741F.2d538 (1984), 
was vacated, four other courts of appeals have ruled prayer clubs unconstitutional. See 
Bell v. Little Axe lndep. School Dist., 766 F.2d 1391 (10th Cir. 1985); Nartowicz v. 
Clayton County School Dist., 736 F.2d 646 (11th Cir. 1984); Lubbock Civil Liberties 
Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 
U.S. 1155 (1983); Brandon v. Bd. of Educ., 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 
454 U.S. 1123 (1981). 
192 54 U.S.L.W. at 4312 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 4312 (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting). 
193 The high school in Williamsport, for example, had few clubs, none of which 
were advocacy clubs similar to the proposed prayer club. The results in Grand Rapids 
and Aguilar demonstrate the Court's unwillingness to accept false arrays in cases 
involving the heightened protection accorded religion in the schools. 
1~ 54 U.S.L.W. 4298 (1986). 
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while on military duty. The option of an unobtrusive exception 
standard-permitting nonuniform gear as long as it is unobtru-
sive-would have addressed the military interest in uniformity 
while allowing Goldman to wear a yarmulke. Yet the Court 
found the government's interest in military uniformity to over-
ride the religious practice, employing a mere "reasonableness" 
test. 195 The Court thus deferred to a majoritarian standard, using 
minimal judicial review. Justice Brennan's dissent makes clear 
the noncompelling nature of the governmental interest in this 
case: 
The Court's response to Goldman's request is to ab-
dicate its role as principal expositor of the Constitution 
and protector of individual liberties in favor of credu-
lous deference to unsupported assertions of military 
necessity . . . . [U]nder the guise of neutrality and 
evenhandedness, majority religions are favored over 
distinctive minority faiths. 196 
Heckler v. Roy191 concerns an American Indian's free ex-
ercise claim to an exemption from the Social Security number 
requirement of AFDC and Food Stamp programs. Given the 
Court's recent elevation of administrative interests, there ap-
pears to be no exemption to the Social Security number require-
ment which would be acceptable to the Court in Roy. 
If the Court is satisfied with administrative interests and 
uniformity as justifications for burdens on religious liberty, other 
arguably more compelling interests, such as protecting against 
establishment or discrimination, are also likely to take prece-
dence. Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook198 and Ohio 
Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools199 pit re-
ligious liberty interests against preference and discrimination 
concerns. Dayton Christian Schools involves a conflict between 
a school's free exercise claim and a female teacher's right not 
195 Id. at 4300. 
196 Id. at 4301, 4303 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
197 No. 84-780, probable jurisdiction noted, 105 S. Ct. 3474 (1985). 
198 No. 85-495, cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 848 (1986). 
199 No. 85-488, jurisdictional issues postponed until hearing on merits, 106 S. Ct. 
379 (1985). 
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to be discriminated against on the basis of sex. At this stage in 
the case, the issue is merely whether the state's civil rights 
commission may assert jurisdiction over the school's decision 
to discharge the teacher. The private school's religious liberty 
claim for hiring appropriate role models is likely to succumb to 
the state's interest in jurisdiction to investigate claims of sex 
discrimination in employment. The religious school's claim of 
exemption from state jurisdiction fails to provide a lesser re-
strictive alternative responsive to the state's concern. 
Philbrook raises issues involving free exercise as it is pro-
tected by Title VII's reasonable accommodation provisions. The 
teacher seeks days off for religious observance during approxi-
mately six holy days each year, while the school provides only 
three such days for religious observance and three days for 
"personal business." The Court may uphold the teacher's pro-
posed accommodation-usage for religious observance of the 
personal business days afforded to other employees, because 
this poses no "undue hardship" to the employer. 200 Moreover, 
in merely treating religious days as equal to other personal 
business days, the accommodation would likely not run afoul 
of the Thornton fairness concerns. However, the teacher's al-
ternative offer of accommodation, whereby he would pay for 
substitute teachers in return for which his own salary would 
remain undiminished, is unlikely to be required by free exercise. 
In light of the Thornton fairness concerns, such accommodation 
might not even be allowed-the arrangements could be seen as 
an endorsement of religion by other school employees, who 
might desire similar arrangements for days off for nonreligious 
reasons. Given the existence of less burdensome alternatives, 
however, such as granting leave without pay, use of the two-
step analysis described above,201 rather than the Thornton ap-
proach, would indicate which accommodations survive estab-
lishment review and are required for free exercise. 
:zoo See Philbrook v. Ansonia Bd. of Educ., 757 F.2d 476, 485 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. 
granted, 54 U.S.L.W. 3484 (1986). 
201 See supra text accompanying notes 186-87. 
